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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES TURCSANSKI, 
Petitioner/Applicant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
and BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal from a 
final order of the Industrial Commission pursuant to Sections 35-
1-86, 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Is there substantial evidence to support the Industrial 
Commission's finding that Petitioner Turcsanski failed to meet 
his burden of demonstrating medical causation between an accident 
on February 13, 1988 and his back and neck problems? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion by 
deciding not to refer the medical aspects of the case to a 
medical panel? 
3. Since Petitioner has not raised, as an issue on appeal, 
either in his docketing statement or initial appellate brief, the 
Commission's ruling that his claim was barred by the one year 
Case No. 920716-CA 
Priority No. 7 
statute of limitations,1 is this appeal moot? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Because these proceedings commenced after January 1, 1988, 
the review by this Court is governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA").2 
A. Standard for Reviewing the Commission's Finding 
Regarding Medical Causation. 
Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in ruling that 
he failed to meet his burden of showing medical causation.3 
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is a 
factual matter".4 Under the UAPA, findings of fact will be 
affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.5 
Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.6 "Petitioner 
necessarily has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and showing that despite the supporting 
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, 
1R. at 112 A-Y. Petitioner's Brief at 1. 
2§§63-46b-l et. seq. of the Utah Code Ann. 
Petitioner's Brief at 1. 
4Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992); 
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) . 
5King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 
(Utah App. 1993); Stewart v. Board of Review, supra at 137; §63-
46b-14(4)(g) of the Utah Code Ann. 
6King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 34. 
2 
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."7 
B. Standard for Reviewing the Commission's Discretionary 
Decision Not to Refer the Medical Aspects of the Case to a 
Medical Panel. 
Petitioner claims that the Commission erred in not referring 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by 
the Commission. Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated 
provides that " . . . the Commission may refer the medical aspects 
of the case to a medical panel . . .f|8 
The Commission, therefore, is expressly granted the 
discretion not to refer a case to a medical panel. Where a grant 
of discretion to an agency exists, this Court " . . . will not 
disturb the agency's interpretation or application of the law, 
unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality."9 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
This case does not involve the interpretation of a statute, 
ordinance, rule or regulation. Rather, the issues presented on 
appeal pertain to the Commission's factual finding of no medical 
causation and the exercise of its discretion granted to it under 
7Id. 
8§35-l-77 of the Utah Code Ann. (1992), emphasis added. 
9King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 35. In Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court applied an "abuse of discretion" standard 
to the Commission's decision not to refer a case to a medical 
panel. 
3 
Utah law. 
The following statutes and rules are, however, controlling 
in his case: 
1. Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Code Annotated.10 
2. Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated.11 
3. Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code Annotated.12 
4. Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988).13 
5. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.14 
6. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.15 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 13, 1988, Petitioner, while employed by the 
City, was on a ladder ten to twelve feet from the floor when the 
ladder slipped.16 He fell, with the ladder beneath him, and 
landed on his back, however, the fall was cushioned because he 
"rode the ladder down" and broke the fall with his hands.17 
When he put his hands down to break his fall, he sustained a 
contusion to his right forearm. He was treated for injuries to 
his right forearm at the Holy Cross Hospital Emergency Room and 
10Appendix "A" attached. 
xlAppendix "B" attached. 
12Appendix "C" attached. 
"Appendix "D" attached. 
14Appendix "E" attached. 
"Appendix "F" attached. 
16R. at 57, R. at 99. 
17R. at 57. 
returned to work the same day.18 He did not miss any time from 
work due to his accident.19 
In a Report of Injury, dated February 13, 1988, Petitioner 
notified the City of the accident and injuries to his right arm 
and knee.20 The report did not mention any injuries to his back 
or neck.21 In 1988, the City paid all of Petitioner's medical 
expenses related to his right arm and knee.22 
Four years after the accident, Petitioner notified the City, 
for the first time, that he had back and neck problems which he 
claimed were attributable to the February 13, 1988 accident.23 
On July 20, 1992, an evidentiary hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine if Petitioner's back 
and neck problems were compensable under the Workers' 
Compensation laws. Based upon the evidence presented at the 
hearing, including all relevant medical records and the testimony 
of Dr. Cory Anden,24 the ALJ ruled that: 
1. Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations for failing to notify the City of his back injury 
within one year after the accident; 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20R. at 60. 
21Id. 
22R. at 101. 
23R. at 101, R. at 58. 
24R. at 59. 
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2. Petitioner did not meet his burden of proving medical 
causation between the accident and his back and neck problems;25 
and 
3. There was no medical issue to justify the use of a 
medical panel.26 
On Petitioner's Motion for Review, the Commission affirmed 
the ALJ's decision.27 
Petitioner filed an appeal with this Court seeking review of 
only " . . . that portion of the Order which held that applicant 
failed to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence."28 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the undisputed facts 
relevant to the Commission's decision: 
1. On February 13, 1988, while employed by the City, 
Petitioner was cleaning the ceiling of a pump house on a ladder 
approximately 10 to 12 feet off the floor.29 
2- The ladder Petitioner was on slipped and, with the 
ladder underneath him, he "rode the ladder" down which cushioned 
his fall, and landed on his back.30 
3. During the fall, Petitioner put his hands down to 
25R. at 60, 61. 
26R. at 61. 
27R. at 98-103. 
28R. at 112. 
29R. at 57. 
30
 Id. 
6 
further break his fall and sustained a contusion on his right 
forearm from a protruding valve.31 
4. After the fall, Petitioner felt pain in his right arm 
and leg.32 
5. At the time of the accident, Petitioner did not feel 
any pain in his back or neck.33 
6. Within hours following the accident, Petitioner went to 
the Emergency Room at Holy Cross Hospital and was examined by Dr. 
James Antinori.34 
7. At no time during the examination on February 13, 1988 
did Petitioner complain of back or neck problems to Dr. 
Antinori.35 
8. As a result of the examination on February 13, 1988, 
Dr. Antinori found injuries only to Petitioner's right 
forearm.36 
9. After the examination by Dr. Antinori, Petitioner 
returned to work the same day of the accident and completed his 
shift.37 
10. Petitioner did not miss any time from work due to the 
31Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34R. at 57, R. at 129. 
35R. at 129. 
36R. at 128. 
37R. at 57. 
7 
accident .38 
11. On February 13, 1988, the date of the accident, 
Petitioner signed and filed a report with the City which stated 
that he ". . . landed on a pump injuring [his] knee and arm."39 
12. The report filed by Petitioner on February 13, 1988 did 
not mention any injuries to his back or neck.40 
13. The City paid all of Petitioner's medical expenses 
submitted by him for care to his right arm and knee.41 
14. On June 22, 1988, the City notified Petitioner, in 
writing, that his workers' compensation file pertaining to the 
February 13, 1988 accident was closed and that the City had paid 
all medical bills related to the claim.42 
15. On March 17, 1988, one month after the accident, 
Petitioner sought medical treatment from Dr. Stephen Barlow.43 
16. During his medical visit with Dr. Stephen Barlow, 
Petitioner made no reference to any back or neck problems.44 
17. On June 22, 1988, four months after the accident, 
Petitioner sought medical care from Dr. Stephen Barlow indicating 
38Id. 
39R. at 6, R. at 60. 
40R. at 6. 
41R. at 122, R. at 60. 
42R. at 123. 
43R. at 135. R. at 57. The ALJ indicated that Petitioner 
saw Dr. King Udall on said date. The Commission, on review, 
corrected the name to Dr. Stephen Barlow. R. at 102. 
44R. at 135. 
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that he had some back discomfort, however, he never mentioned the 
accident on February 13, 1988. On examination, Dr. Barlow found 
no back injury and diagnosed prostatis.45 
18. More than a year after the accident, Petitioner saw Dr. 
King Udall for several problems including neck discomfort and 
depression. Dr. Udall characterized the depression as being of 
"greater concern" and prescribed Prozac.46 
19. After a November 20, 1989 visit by Petitioner, Dr. 
Udall ordered a cervical x-ray on his back. The x-ray report 
indicates "marked degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc 
. "
47 
20. Following a December 26, 1989 visit by Petitioner, 
Dr. Udall noted that "Mr. Turcsanski has had acute pain in the 
mid-back, mainly on the left side. He had had this kind of 
problem in the past, usually with acute infection. His neck is 
somewhat better." Dr. Udall prescribed muscle relaxants.48 
21. On May 28, 1991, Dr. Udall met with Petitioner and 
noted "Jim again has severe low back pain. He is still concerned 
about sexual dysfunction." Dr. Udall prescribed Anaprox.49 
22. On December 3, 1991, Dr. Udall met with Petitioner and 
45R. at 136. R. at 57. 
46R. at 57. 
47Id. 
48R. at 58. 
49Id. 
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noted "no acute problems."50 
23. From 1989 through 1992, Petitioner sought medical care 
from Dr. King Udall for other different problems including 
bronchitis, sinus conditions, cholesterol and depression.51 
24. At no time, prior to December 1991, did Petitioner 
mention to Dr. King Udall, during the many visits he had with 
Dr. Udall, the accident of February 13, 1988.52 
25. In December 1991, Petitioner understood that he was 
unable to get health insurance coverage for his 1991 back 
problems because they were excluded under a pre-existing 
condition provision.53 
26. In December 1991, Petitioner contacted the City 
requesting workers' compensation coverage for his back and neck 
problems which he claimed were sustained in the accident on 
February 13, 1988.54 His request to the City in December 1991 
was the first time he notified the City of his back and neck 
problems and that he attributed these problems to an accident on 
February 13, 1988.55 
27. The City denied Petitioner's workers' compensation 
50Id. 
51Id. 
52
 Id . 
53
 Id . 
54Id. 
55R. a t 6 0 . 
10 
claim in December 1991.56 
28. Based on a referral of Dr. James Antinori, Petitioner 
was evaluated by Dr. Cory Anden on December 9, 1991.57 
29. Dr. Anden stated, in her notes from the visit on 
December 9, 1991, that Petitioner reported developing neck pain 
and tenderness in about 1990. She further indicated that he had 
been evaluated by Dr. Udall and diagnosed with degenerative 
changes .58 
30. On December 23, 1991, Dr. Anden met with Petitioner and 
evaluated x-rays that were taken on his back.59 
31. On December 23, 1991, Dr. Anden7s report stated that 
there were "post traumatic changes of the L5 vertebral body with 
disc space narrowing at L4-5 most likely sustained in the 
industrial fall in 1988; possible left L3-4 radiculopathy 
secondary to disc herniation; [and] left gluteus medius muscular 
strain. "60 
32. On July 7, 1992, based on a review of the February 13, 
1988 emergency room medical records, Dr. Anden issued an opinion 
correcting her prior remark of December 23, 1991 stating: 
I feel that this was an incorrect statement on my part, 
in that, if a traumatic vertebral compression fracture 
had been sustained in the fall, he would have had 
56R. at 58. 
57Id. 
58
 Id. 
59Id. 
60Id. 
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complaints of back pain at the time, not over one year 
later. A more correct statement would have been that 
it is possible that the lumbar injury was sustained in 
the fall, although it could have been related to any 
prior or subsequent traumatic injury, as no other 
lumbar x-rays had been obtained to determine the age of 
abnormality.61 
33. In her July 7, 1992 opinion, Dr. Anden concluded: 
. . . [I]n more complete review of the records and Mr. 
Turcsanski's complaints of low back pain, I cannot 
state with any degree of medical certainty that the 
lumbar injury was sustained at the time of the work-
related fall of 2-13-88. In fact, it is unlikely that 
the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at L5 was 
sustained in the fall.62 
34. Dr. Roger Stuart performed a medical file review 
relating to Petitioner's back and neck problems.63 On July 9, 
1992, Dr. Stuart issued an opinion concluding that: 
[Petitioner's] . . . history and x-rays are very 
typical of the gradual and at times progressive nature 
of degenerative spinal changes related to age, genetic 
predisposition and activities. There is no documented 
cervical or lumbar pain at or near the time of his 
February 13, 1988 fall. Thus there is no evidence to 
support the assertion that the fall played a pivotal or 
major role in developing the diffuse degenerative 
changes on Mr. Turcsanski's x-rays or in his current 
back pain problem.64 
35. At the evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on July 20, 1992, Dr. Cory Anden testified that the 
absence of contemporaneous back pain was critical to her written 
opinion of July 7, 1992. She testified that she would have 
61R. at 59. 
6 2Id. Emphasis added. 
6 3Id. 
64
 I d . 
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expected Petitioner's back to be "acutely painful" for 4 to 6 
weeks after the fall if, in fact, a compression fracture had 
occurred.65 
36. On August 24, 1992, the ALJ ruled that: 
a. Petitioner's claim fails due to the application of 
the statute of limitations. The notice of a back injury was 
not given to employer until four years after the 
accident.66 
b. Beyond the statute of limitations, Petitioner has 
failed to sustain his burden of proving medical causation in 
relation to the treatment of his back. Medical causation is 
lacking due to (1) the absence of back pain at the time of 
the 1988 fall, (2) the absence of missed work at the time of 
the fall or thereafter, (3) the multi-year long delay in 
Petitioner's attribution of the back pain to the fall, (4) 
Petitioner's inconsistent reports of back pain to health 
care providers while readily seeking treatment for other 
conditions, (5) the inability of his physicians to state a 
causal relationship between the 1988 fall and the back pain, 
(6) the documented presence of degenerative disc disease as 
an alternative cause of his pain, and (7) the suggestion 
that one of Petitioner's motives in making this claim was to 
obtain coverage through workers' compensation insurance 
several years later because it was being denied him through 
65
 Id. 
66R. at 60. 
13 
his private health insurance.67 
c. Since the records do not identify any medical or 
factual link between the fall and back pain, and because 
none of the doctors will go beyond the realm of 
"possibility", there is no significant medical issue to 
justify use of a medical panel.68 
37. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision on September 
29, 1992.69 
38. On October 29, 1992, Petitioner filed a Writ of Review 
requesting this Court to review " . . . that portion of the 
[Commission's] Order which held that [Petitioner] . . . failed to 
prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence".70 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Commission's decision for the 
following reasons: 
1. Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support of 
the Commission's findings and shown that despite the supporting 
facts, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
The evidence is more than substantial to support the Commission's 
decision that Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing 
medical causation. 
67R. at 60-61. 
68R. at 61. A copy of the ALJ's "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order" is attached as Appendix "G". 
69R. at 98. A copy of the Commission's "Denial of Motion 
for Review" is attached as Appendix "H". 
70R. at 112. 
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2. The Commission's discretionary decision not to refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel was within the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. According to Utah law, 
the Commission's decision not to refer the medical aspects of a 
case to a medical panel is "discretionary". Based on the facts 
before it, the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that there were no significant issues for a medical 
panel. 
3. Petitioner did not appeal the Commission's decision 
that the statute of limitations bars his claim pursuant to 
Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988) . Accordingly, 
without more, the Commission's decision denying Petitioner 
workers' compensation benefits for his back and neck problems 
must be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED 
TO DEMONSTRATE MEDICAL CAUSATION BETWEEN AN 
ACCIDENT ON FEBRUARY 13, 1988 AND HIS BACK 
AND NECK PROBLEMS. 
A. Medical causation is a factual matter. 
Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in finding that 
he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical causation 
between an accident on February 13, 1988 and his back and neck 
problems.71 
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is 
71Petitioner's Brief at 1 and 5. 
15 
a factual matter."72 Petitioner, however, attempts, without 
citing any authority, to transform medical causation from an 
issue of fact to one of law, which would necessitate a different 
standard of review.73 
In Stewart v. Board of Review,74 a worker claimed, as does 
the Petitioner in this case, that the Commission erred when it 
found insufficient credible evidence to support a conclusion that 
an accident caused her injuries.75 This Court analyzed the 
issue raised by the worker in Stewart as a factual matter.76 
This Court, in Stewart, accepted the ALJ's findings as conclusive 
because the worker did not marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that those findings were 
unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the proper 
standard of review regarding medical causation is whether the 
Commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
B. The Commission's finding regarding the absence of 
medical causation is supported by substantial evidence. 
"Substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable person "might 
72Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992); 
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App. 1991) . 
73Petitioner's Brief at 5. There is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the Commission required a burden of proof other 
than a preponderance of the evidence. 
74Stewart v. Board of Review, supra. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
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accept as adequate to support a conclusion."77 There is more 
than adequate evidence to support the Commission's finding that 
Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical 
causation between the accident on February 13, 1988 and his back 
and neck problems. 
Immediately after the accident, Petitioner felt no pain in 
his back or neck.78 Within hours after the accident, Petitioner 
was examined by Dr. James Antinori at the Emergency Room of the 
Holy Cross Hospital.79 During the examination, Petitioner never 
complained to Dr. Antinori of back or neck pain.80 Dr. Antinori 
noted in his records that the only injuries sustained by 
Petitioner were contusions to his right forearm.81 After the 
examination by Dr. Antinori, Petitioner returned to work the same 
day and completed his shift.82 Petitioner did not miss any time 
from work due to the accident.83 On the date of the accident, 
Petitioner signed and filed a report with the City which stated 
that he ". . . landed on a pump injuring [his] knee and arm.84 
77Kincr v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 34. 
78Fact 15. 
79Fact %6. 
80Fact 1|7. 
81Fact 1|8. 
82Fact f9. 
83Fact HlO. 
84Fact 111. 
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Petitioner never mentioned back or neck problems in the 
report.85 In 1988, the City paid all medical expenses relating 
to Petitioner's arm and knee.86 
One month after the accident, Petitioner met with Dr. 
Stephen Barlow for a regular medical visit and never mentioned 
the accident of February 13, 1988. Four months after the 
accident, Petitioner sought further medical care from Dr. Barlow 
and mentioned some back discomfort.87 Dr. Barlow examined the 
Petitioner and found that there was no back injury.88 
From 1989 to December 1991, Petitioner visited his family 
physician, Dr. King Udall, for several problems including 
depression and some neck and back discomfort.89 On examination 
of Petitioner's back, Dr. Udall noted that x-rays showed marked 
"degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc, lf90 or low back 
pain associated with "acute infection".91 Significantly, 
Petitioner never mentioned the February 13, 1988 accident to Dr. 
King Udall in any of his visits prior to December 1991.92 
In December 1991, approximately four years after the 
85Fact 112. 
86Fact Hl3. 
87Fact fl5. 
88Fact 117. 
"Fact 118. 
90Fact 119. 
91Fact 1(20. 
92Fact 124. 
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accident, Petitioner contacted the City claiming that his back 
and neck problems should be covered by workers' compensation 
because they resulted from the accident on February 13, 1988.93 
This was the first time the City was notified of Petitioner's 
back and neck problems.94 Coincidentally, at the time 
Petitioner notified the City, it was his understanding that, as a 
result of a change in his health insurance, he would not be 
covered for his back and neck problems because of a pre-existing 
condition provision.95 
In December 1991, as a result of a referral by Dr. James 
Antinori, Dr. Cory Anden, a physiatrist, issued a letter, based 
on information given to her by the Petitioner, stating that 
Petitioner may have a small focal compression and mild narrowing 
of the L4-5 disc space as well as a mild interior steophyte 
formation at the L4 vertebral body.96 
Initially, Dr. Anden indicated that, "it is probable that 
the lumbar injury seen on the x-ray was sustained in this 
fall."97 However, on July 7, 1992, after reviewing the 
emergency room records prepared on the date of the accident and 
learning that Petitioner experienced no pain in his back 
contemporaneously with the accident or months later, Dr. Anden 
93Fact 1(26. 
94Fact f26. 
95Fact f25. 
96Fact 131. 
97Fact 131. 
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corrected her remarks of December 1991 stating that Petitioner's 
back and neck problems could have been the result of any number 
of causes including the normal agency process.98 She further 
indicated that she could not state with any medical certainty 
that the February 13, 1988 accident caused Petitioner's back and 
neck problems." Dr. Anden concluded that it was unlikely the 
small focal compression was caused by the accident.100 
Dr. Anden testified at the hearing before the ALJ and 
without hesitation, reaffirmed her opinion that it is unlikely 
the lumbar vertebral compression fracture was sustained in the 
fall on February 13, 1988.101 
Dr. Roger Stuart, on examination of the medical files, 
reached the same conclusion as Dr. Anden. In Dr. Stuart's 
opinion, Petitioner's back and neck problems are typical of a 
gradual and, at times, progressive nature of degenerative spinal 
changes related to age, genetic predisposition and activities. 
He concluded that "there is no evidence to support the assertion 
that the fall played a pivotal or major role in developing the 
diffuse degenerative changes . . . or in [Petitioner's] current 
back pain problems."102 
98Fact 132. 
"Id. 
1 0 0Fact 1(33. 
1 0 1Fact 1(35. 
1 0 2Fact 1(34. 
20 
This Court, in Stokes v. Board of Review,103 held that: 
Medical evidence is insufficient to prove industrial 
causation of any injury if it is equally probable that 
a non-industrial accident caused the condition.104 
Accordingly, the ALJ, as affirmed by the Commission, 
properly determined that there was no medical causation according 
to Stokes v. Board of Review,105 because: (a) Petitioner 
experienced no pain to his back or neck contemporaneous with the 
accident or months thereafter, (b) a medical examination 6 months 
after the accident showed no back injury, (c) he never mentioned 
the accident to any medical care provider in four years, even 
though he made several visits, until he believed that his health 
insurance would not cover his back and neck problems; (d) the 
opinions of Dr. Anden and Dr. Stewart agreed that it was unlikely 
the accident caused his back and neck problems; and (e) it is 
almost impossible to identify the cause of Petitioner's back and 
neck problems with the lapse of four years. 
Petitioner presented no medical evidence to prove, beyond 
"mere possibility", that the accident on February 13, 1988 was 
the medical cause of his back problems. Findings of fact and 
imposition of liability cannot properly be made on "mere 
possibility".106 Substantial evidence clearly supports the 
Commission's decision. 
103Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1992). 
104Id. at 58. 
105Stokes v. Board of Review, supra. 
106Anderson v. Dominic Electric, 660 P.2d 241 (Utah 1983) . 
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C. Petitioner failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the findings and show that despite those facts, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
If appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding 
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion.107 
This Court, in King v. Industrial Commission,108 stated 
that: 
. . . our procedural rules specifically require a 
petitioner to provide a transcript of the proceedings 
if he is going to challenge factual findings under 
subsection 63-46b-16(4)(g) [of the UAPA]. A petitioner 
must also provide a transcript if he argues a legal 
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence in the case. 
Otherwise, we have no basis on which to evaluate the 
findings and conclusions.109 
The Petitioner has not only failed to provide a transcript 
on appeal,110 he resisted the City's efforts to compel 
Petitioner to order and submit a transcript.111 
In his efforts to "marshal the evidence" to challenge the 
Commission's findings, Petitioner argues that Dr. Cory Anden, at 
one time, stated that it is probable the lumbar injury was 
107Rule 11(e) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
108King v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
109Id. at 34. 
110R. at 117-118. 
1UR. at 118-D, R. at 118-E. 
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sustained in the fall.112 It is an undisputed fact, however, 
that Dr. Anden corrected her initial statement based upon a 
review of the Emergency Room records and learning that Petitione 
did not feel pain in his back and neck at the time of the 
accident or months thereafter.113 Dr. Anden ultimately 
concluded that it is unlikely that the lumbar vertebral 
compression fracture at L5 was sustained in the fall. 
Dr. Anden later reaffirmed her opinion when she testified at 
the hearing before the ALJ under oath and subject to cross-
examination by Petitioner's counsel. The Commission found Dr. 
Anden's testimony to be credible, including her explanation as tc 
the correction of her prior statement. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that as an appellate court, "it has no power to 
determine the weight of the evidence or credibility of the 
witnesses."114 It is inherent within the prerogatives of the 
Commission, as fact finder, to judge the credibility of witnesses 
and draw any reasonable inferences.115 
The Petitioner next argues that if he did not have a 
degenerative condition, there is no other trauma, except the 
fall, to account for his back problems. There is, however, 
nothing in the record to support Petitioner's statement that he 
112Petitioner's Brief at 6. 
113Fact H32. 
114Bicrfoot's Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 714 P.2d 1152 
(Utah 1986) . 
115See, Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P.2d 44 (Utah 1966). 
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did not have a degenerative condition. On the contrary, the 
record indicates that he has a degenerative condition.116 
Further, there is nothing in the record which supports his 
statement that no other trauma occurred. UnLess Petitioner was 
absolutely dormant during the four year period between the 
accident and the time he notified the City, any number of 
exertions could have caused his problems. 
Petitioner further argues, without citing the record, that 
the Commission required him to show that it was "highly likely" 
his back problem resulted from his accident.117 There is, 
however, nothing in the record to show that the Commission 
applied a burden of proof other than a preponderance of the 
evidence. The Commission did state that the "mere possibility" 
of medical causation is insufficient which is consistent with 
this Court's decision in Stokes v. Board of Review.118 
Petitioner apparently challenges the weight given to the 
evidence by the Commission. In an appellate review, however, 
this Court: 
. . . will not ordinarily weigh the evidence nor 
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on 
findings of fact or choices between conflicting 
testimony or inferences . . . .119 
Finally, Petitioner states that " . . . the City has already 
116Facts H1l9, 32 and 34. 
^Petitioner's Brief at 7. 
118Stokes v. Board of Review, supra. 
1193 Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §80.21 (a) 
(1992). 
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conceded that it is equally probable that the claim of 
[Petitioner] . . . is valid."120 As authority for the so-called 
concession, Petitioner takes, out of context, a statement made by 
the City in the argument part of a memorandum opposing 
Petitioner's Motion for Review and then cites the statement as a 
factual finding. The referenced statement in the City's 
memorandum paralleled the standard expressed by this Court in 
Stokes v. Board of Review.121 The City was arguing that 
minimally, the medical evidence demonstrated that it was equally 
probable a non-industrial exertion caused petitioner's back and 
neck problems. It is an undisputed fact, however, that there is 
no medical evidence, beyond "mere possibility", to demonstrate 
medical causation. If Petitioner is citing the City's argument 
as a fact, then he should also accept, as a fact, the City's 
argument that there is no medical causation between the February 
13, 1988 accident and his back and neck problems. 
Accordingly, Petitioner fails to marshal the evidence and 
draw this Court's attention to any flaw in the evidence relied 
upon by the Commission in reaching its decision. 
120Petitioner's Brief at 5 and 6. 
121Stokes v. Board of Review, supra. 
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POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION'S DISCRETIONARY DECISION NOT 
TO REFER THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE TO A 
MEDICAL PANEL WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF 
REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY. 
Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that 
" . . . the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the case 
to a medical panel appointed by the Commission."122 The 
controlling statute provides for permissive referral.123 The 
Commission, therefore, has an express grant of discretion not to 
refer the medical aspects of a case to a medical panel. 
Where a grant of discretion to an agency exists, " . . . 
[this court] will not disturb the agency's interpretation or 
application of the law unless its determination exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness and ra t iona l i ty . " 1 2 4 
The Petitioner argues that the Commission erred by not 
referring the case to a medical panel based on its interpretation 
of Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated - the one year 
statute of limitations. The Commission, however, did not rely on 
the statute of limitations in its decision not to refer the case 
to a medical panel. Rather, the Commission decided, within its 
discretion, not to refer the case to a medical panel because 
"there was no significant medical issue for the medical panel to 
122§35-l-77 of the Utah Code Ann. , emphasis added. 
123Workers/ Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 
P.2d 572 (Utah App. 1988). 
124King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 35. 
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determine. ,fl25 
The Commission's exercise of its discretion did not exceed 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
There was no conflict in the medical evidence. Dr. Anden 
and Dr. Stuart concurred that it was unlikely the lumbar 
vertebral compression fracture was sustained in the fall on 
February 13, 1988. There is no evidence, beyond "mere 
possibility", of medical causation between the accident on 
February 13, 1988 and Petitioner's back and neck problems. Not 
only is there a lack of medical evidence demonstrating medical 
causation, the facts show that Petitioner experienced no pain in 
his back or neck at the time of the accident or for months 
thereafter/126 the Emergency Room records show no injury to his 
back or neck;127 he missed no work time as a result of the 
accident/128 he never mentioned the accident to any of his 
medical care providers for four years/129 four months after the 
accident, Dr. Barlow found no back injury/ and Petitioner 
notified the City for the first time of his back and neck 
problems four years after the accident. 
The Commission did not abuse its discretion by deciding not 
to refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel. 
125Fact H36. 
126Fact 1{5. 
127Fact f7. 
128Fact K9. 
129Fact ff7, 16, 24. 
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POINT III. 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION THAT PETITIONER'S 
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY SECTION 35-1-99 OF THE 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. (1988) IS DISPOSITIVE OF 
THIS CASE. 
The Commission determined that Petitioner's claim was barred 
by Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988) because he 
failed to notify the City of his alleged back and neck problems 
within one year from the date of the accident.130 The 
Petitioner notified the City of his alleged back and neck 
problems approximately four years after the accident.131 
The Petitioner only appealed " . . . that portion of the 
[Commission's] Order which held that [Petitioner] . . . failed to 
prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence."132 The 
Commission's decision regarding the statute of limitations was 
not raised as an issue by Petitioner in his docketing statement 
or his initial appellate brief.133 
Since Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
limits the material contained in reply briefs to "answering any 
new matter set forth in opposing briefs", this Court will not 
address the decision of the Commission regairding the statute of 
limitations. Accordingly, the Commission's decision that 
Petitioner's claim was barred by the applicable statute of 
130Fact H36. §35-1-99 of the Utah Code Ann. (1988). 
131Fact 126. 
132Fact f3 8. 
133R. at 112A-Y, Petitioner's Brief at 1. 
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limitations is final and, without more, disposes of this 
case.134 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasons stated herein, the City respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the Commission's decision denying 
Petitioner worker's compensation for his back and neck problems< 
DATED this /3 day of IjtuU , 1993. 
FRANK M. NAKAMURA 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
134It should be noted that the purpose of the one year 
statute of limitations is particularly applicable in this case. 
As a result of the four year lapse of time, it is almost 
impossible to identify the cause of the Petitioner's back and 
neck problems. Unless Petitioner was absolutely dormant in the 
last four years, the cause of his back and neck problems could 
have resulted from any number of causes including the normal 
aging process. Further, the medical evidence shows that it is 
unlikely that the accident caused Petitioner's back and neck 
problems because he did not feel any back or neck pain at the 
time of the accident or months thereafter. If Petitioner had 
felt pain in his back and neck at the time of the accident or 
months thereafter, he likely would have reported the problems to 
the City in a timely manner. The absence of back and neck pain 
at the time of the accident or months thereafter was an important 
factor, in the opinion of Dr. Anden and Dr. Stewart, that there 
was no medical causation. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of Respondent's 
Brief to Robert Breeze, Attorney for Applicant, 221 East Broadway 
#215, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and one copy to Benjamin A. 
Sims, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-6600, by depositing the same in the U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, this / £ day of fj^Qf , 1993. I AM 
FMN:CC 
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APPENDIX "A" 
35-1-43 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 466 
tion, the burden of proof being on any person 
seeking to establish the contrary; and 
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing 
that a partner of a partnership or an owner 
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control 
or responsibility for any failure to insure or 
otherwise provide adequate payment of di-
rect compensation may only be overcome by 
clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary. 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection 
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov-
erage under Subsection 35-1-43(3)(b). 1992 
35-1-43. '"Employee," "worker" or "workmen," 
and "operative" defined — Mining les-
sees and sublessees — Partners and 
sole proprietors — Corporate officers 
and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workmen," and "operative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and 
any other person, in the service of the state, or of 
any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, 
town, or school district under any election or ap-
pointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learn-
ing; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, 
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but 
not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em-
ployer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of 
mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the 
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this 
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent 
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such 
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar 
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur-
ance premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chap-
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission-naming the persons to be 
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of 
a sole proprietorship is _coiisidered__an_employee 
under this_chapter until -this.Jioticejiaajjefin 
given. For premium rate making, -the-insurance 
earner shall assume the salary~or~ wage of the 
employee to be^.150% of the state's average 
weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an em-
ployee under this chaDter. If a cnmnraH/m moL-A« 
naming the persons to be excluded from cover-
age. A director or officer of a corporation is con-
sidered an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec-
tion 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for 
a real estate broker if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from 
real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso-
ciated broker are performed under a written con-
tract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as 
an employee for federal income tax purposes, lses 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av-
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in Section 35-1-75. 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this title. 
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically im-
paired as to function. Disability can be total or 
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or 
nonindustrial. 
(5) "General order" means an order applying 
generally throughout the state to all persons, em-
ployments, or places of employment of a class un-
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other 
orders of the commission shall be considered spe-
cial orders. 
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition 
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnor-
mality or loss. Impairment may be either tempo-
rary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regula-
tion, direction, requirement or standard of the 
commission, or any other determination arrived 
at, or decision made, by the commission. 
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of employment" includes 
any injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because 
of his employment 
(b) The term does not include a disease, 
except as the disease results from the injury. 
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any em-
ployment or place of employment, means the 
freedom from danger to the life, health, or wel-
fare of employees reasonably permitted by the 
nature of the employment. 
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and 
moral well-being. iwi 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case o( death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. isss 
35-1-46. Employers to secure workers' compen-
sation benefits for employees —. 
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunc-
tion — Violation. 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, 
and school districts, shall secure the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay* 
ment of this compensation with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence within 30 days after any final 
award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with any stock corpo-
ration or mutual association authorized to trans-
act the business of workers' compensation insur-
ance in this state, which payments shall com-
mence within 30 days after any final award by 
the commission; or 
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and 
when due as provided for in this title, which pay-
ments shall commence within 30 days after any 
final award by the commission. In these cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the de-
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to 
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as 
they are incurred, and may at any time change or 
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if 
in its judgment this action is necessary or desir-
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with 
all the provisions of law relating to the payment 
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and bur-
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de-
pendents of killed employees. The commission 
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi-
lege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter, 
from further operation of the employer's business, 
where the employer has failed to provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, 
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the 
employer's business until the payment of these bene-
fits has been secured by the employer as required by 
this section. The court may enjoin the employer with-
out requiring bond from the commission. 
(3) If the commission has reason to believe that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a 
business without securing the payment of compensa-
tion in one of the three ways provided in this section, 
the commission may give such employer five days' 
written notice by registered mail of such noncompli-
ance and if the employer within said period does not 
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as 
provided in this section and the court is empowered, 
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the further operation ot tne em-
ployer's business. i989 
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompliance to em-
ployer — Enforcement power of com-
mission — Penalty. 
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that 
an employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the 
commission may give that employer written notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known 
address of the employer. 
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default 
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the com-
mission may issue an order requiring the employer to 
appear before the commission and show cause why 
the employer should not be ordered to comply with 
the provisions of Section 35-1-46. 
(3) If it is found that the employer has failed to 
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three 
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission 
may order any employer to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 35-1-46. 
(4) The commission may also impose, at the time of 
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not 
more than one and one-half times the amount of the 
premium the employer would have paid for workers' 
compensation insurance had that employer been in-
sured by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
during the period of noncompliance. 
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107 
and used for the purposes of that fund. 1967 
35-1-46.20. Requirements of any order of the 
commission — Court enforcement 
Any order issued by the commission under author-
ity of Section 35-1-46.10 shall be in writing, shall be 
sent by registered mail to the last known address of 
the employer, and shall state the findings and order 
of the commission. The order shall specify its effective 
date, which may be immediate or may be at a later 
date. The order of the commission, upon application 
by the commission made on or after the effective date 
of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any 
county in this state, may be enforced by an order to 
comply entered ex parte and without notice by the 
court 1966 
3&»l-4&30. Employer's penalty for violation — 
Notice of noncompliance — Proof re-
quired — Admissible evidence — Crim-
inal prosecution. 
(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every 
officer of a corporation or association which fails to 
comply, with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to 
comply is a separate offense. All funds, fines, or pen-
alties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the 
Uninstured Employers' Fund created by Section 
35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund If the 
commission has sent written notice of noncompliance 
by registered mail to the last known address of the 
employer, corporation, or officers of a corporation or 
association, and the employer, corporation, or officers 
do not within ten days provide to the commission 
proof of compliance, the notice and failure to provide 
proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the em-
ployer, corporation, or officers were in violation of 
this section. 
35-1-75 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of computation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Hourly employees. actual number of hours he or she worked per 
Minimum hours, week in calculating the compensation rate, the 
The fact that an employee voluntarily lim- Legislature would not have included a statu-
ited his work hours to 13 per week did not tory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection (l)(e). 
make it unfair to award him compensation American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
benefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
intended to limit an hourly employee to the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Workers' compensation: bonus as 
factor in determining amount of compensation, 
84 A.L.R.4th 1055. 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical 
panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same 
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
Ob) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from per-
forming work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of 
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occu-
pational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, pro-
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longed, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, 
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so 
contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, leted the former second sentence, which read 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch- 57, § 1; 1969, "The panel shall have the qualifications gener-
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, ally applicable to the medical panel under Sec-
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13. tion 35-2-56"; added Subsections (1Kb) and (c) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted the (l)(d); and added the second sentence in Sub-
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de- section (2Kb). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Referral to panel. 
Effect of 1982 amendment — Discretion. 
Referral to panel. The court of appeals cannot say that the ad-
—Discretion. ministrative law judge abused his discretion in 
Cited. not referring the case to a medical panel when 
Effect of 1982 amendment there was medical evidence to support Ins find-
In accord with bound volume. See Ortiz v. ^ ^ f ^ p 0 * ^ ^ 
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct T- " S j ™ 1 C o m m n ' 7 6 1 R 2 d 5 7 2 ( U t a h C t 
App. 1989). A p p - 1 9 8 8 )-
This section is procedural and may be ap- Cited in Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n, 755 
plied to an accident that occurred prior to the P.2d 166 (Utah Ct App. 1988); USX Corp. v. 
1982 amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 383 (Utah C t 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Ct App. 1989). App. 1989). 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking mdieial revwuw k«» K~~- —i—«•—*-• •• 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, IB unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
tha t is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
63-46b~17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the «mrf ™»« 
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Form of report which he describes the injury. Utah Delaware-
The attending physician makes his report on Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 
a pnnted blank furnished for that purpose in 239 P. 94 (1930). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation 
uon § 266. ** 979. 
35-1-99. Notice of injury and claim for compensation — 
Limitations of action. 
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the 
service of his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to 
his employer or the commission of the time and place where the accident and 
injury occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's 
claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly barred. If, for amy reason, an 
employee is himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's next-
of-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period. Receipt of 
written notice is presumed if the employer complies with the terms of Section 
35-1-97 by filing with the commission an accident report, or if the employer or 
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the 
injured employee. 
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's medical benefit 
entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee 
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, 
for a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably related to 
the industrial accident. 
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, tempo-
rary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or per-
manent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date 
of the accident. 
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
History: CX. 1917, J 3156s, added by L. the present second and third sentences for the 
1921, ch. 67,1; &S. 1933,42-1-92; L. 1939, ch. former last four sentences, relating to the same 
51, $ 1; C. 1943,42-1-92; L. 1981, ch. 287, § 6; subject matter, and, in the first sentence, de-
1988, ch. 211, § 11; 1988, ch. 118, § 9. Ieted the proviso clause at the end, relating to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- knowledge being equivalent to notice and to 
merit, effective July 1, 1986, in the first sen- defect or inaccuracies in the notice, and, in the 
tence, substituted "accident and injur/' for remaining language, substituted "If an em-
"same", substituted "in the notice subjects" for ployee claiming to have suffered an industrial 
"therein shall subject* and made minor word accident in the service of his employer fails to 
changes; made stylistic changes in the second give written notice within 180 calendar days to 
sentence; divided the former third sentence his employer or the commiaaion" for "When an 
into three sentences and made stylistic employee claiming to have suffered an injury 
changes therein; and, in the fourth sentence, in the service of his employer fails to give no-
deleted "industrial commission and" before tice to his employer" and "the employee's claim 
employee" and made minor word changes. for benefits under this chapter is wholly 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, barred" for "within 48 hours, when possible, or 
designated the previously undesignated Ian- mils to report for medical treatment within 
Ittage as Subsection (1), added Subsections (2) that time, the compensation provided for here-
taough (4) and, in Subsection (1), substituted in shall be reduced 15%." 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ments and authorities. An appellate court's re-
jection of appellant's contentions as unmento-
Dismissal by court. ^ous
 d o e s n o t d e n y ^ y^ right of appeal. 
Summary affirmance. Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
Time for filing.
 A p p 1 9 8 g ) . state v. Palmer, 786 P.2d 248 
C l t e d
- (Utah Ct App. 1990) (decided under former 
Dismissal by court Rule 10, Utah R. Ct. App.). 
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition Time for filing. 
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See A motion for summary disposition that is 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct clearly meritorious supports a suspension of 
App. 1987). the time limitation contained in this rule. 
Summary affirmance. B a i l e y v - A d a m s ' 7 9 8 R 2 d 1 1 4 2 ( U t a h Ct- APP-
Summary affirmance under this rule is a de- 1990). 
termination of the appeal on its merits, after Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
the parties have been afforded a full and ade- Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218 
quate opportunity to present relevant argu- (Utah 1991). 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet, 
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified 
by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for 
the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under 
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original 
papers and any transcript filed in that court in chronological order and shall 
prepare a chronological index of those papers. The index shall contain a refer-
ence to the date on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the 
starting page of the record on which the paper will be found. Clerks of the 
trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking 
out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an 
appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be in-
cluded by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall 
consist of the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the 
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmit-
ted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In 
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, 
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the 
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers 
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the 
trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or sepa-
rate designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs. 
Only those designated papers and the following, to the extent appli-
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(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from 
which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of 
law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer 
than 300 pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate 
court. Where all papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the 
parties shall, within 10 days after briefing is completed, file with the 
agency a joint or separate designation of those papers necessary to the 
appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to the appel-
late court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency 
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of 
the record or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All 
parts of the record retained by the agency shall be considered part of the 
record on review for all purposes. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
*o appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to 
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate 
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of 
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were 
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber 
certified in accordance with the rule3 and procedures of the Judicial 
Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as 
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by 
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may 
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon 
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is 
subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion* If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion, 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the 
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days 
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be 
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request 
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a tran-
script of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, 
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation 
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of 
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so noti-
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fied the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall 
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for pay-
ment of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and 
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal 
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together 
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present 
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon 
approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceed-
ings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as 
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the 
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmit-
ted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if neces-
sary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties 
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is listic changes in the third sentence; in Subdivi-
amended to make applicable in the Supreme sion (b) inserted "and any transcript" and sub-
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for stituted "a chronological index" for "an alpha-
preparing a transcript where the record is betical index" in the first sentence and added 
maintained by an electronic recording device, the third sentence; and in Subdivision (d) de-
The rule is modified slightly from the former leted "and Exhibits" from the heading, deleted 
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appei- "original" before "papers" in four places, re-
lant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsi- wrote the introductory paragraph in Subdivi-
bility to arrange for the preparation of the sion (2), deleting a second sentence similar to 
transcript. the new third sentence in Subdivision (b), de-
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- leted "by the parties, as set forth in Rule 
ment. effective October 1, 1992, added the sec- 12(b)(2)" from the end of the first sentence in 
ond sentence in Subdivision (a) and made sty- Subdivision (2)(A), and added Subdivision <3). 
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•emanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
W been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accom-
panied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal 
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
•ball also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appel-
lant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed 
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 
jays after the response is filed. 
*" (c) Order of the court Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and 
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the 
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the 
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appel-
lant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
mated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other proce-
dural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
> (e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall 
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact 
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Eviden-
tiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable 
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the 
fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial 
court shall enter written findings of fact. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required 
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon prepa-
ration of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings 
Wore the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk 
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
tibe preparation of the entire record. 
Jfg) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the 
ial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule 
fcr briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
ie during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
- -ewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
3(6e findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
•Mne standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
fjMded effective October 1, 1992.) 
fcile 24. Briefs. 
, (a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
•Ppropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(DA complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
ta inside the cover. 
f (2) A table of contents, with page references. 
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula. 
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. j 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further bneft 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g)-
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If de-
termination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under sub-
paragraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form* 
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of 
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fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document 
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
must now contain for each issue raised on ap- ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the 
ptal, a statement of the applicable standard of third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-
review and citation of supporting authority. listic changes m Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS sion, the following points should be developed 
Constitutional arguments. a n d ^PP01*60* ^^ authority and analysis. 
Contents. First, counsel should offer analysis of the 
"-Argument. unique context in which Utah's constitution 
^Inappropriate language. developed with regard to the issue at hand. 
—Issues raised. Second, counsel should demonstrate that state 
-Statement of facts with citation to record. appellate courts regularly interpret even 
*-—Failure to contain. textually similar state constitutional provi-
—Standard of review. s^ons i n a manner different from federal mter-
Failure to file. pretations of the United States Constitution 
—Defective appeal. and knat it i* entirely proper to do so in our 
^Perty documented argument. federal system. Third, citation should be made 
BfPty brief. to authority from other states supporting the 
Cited. particular construction urged by counsel. State 
Constitutional arguments. v* **»> 8 0 3 R 2 d 1 2 6 8 ( U t a h C t A P * 1990)* 
In order to make an argument for an mnova- Contents. 
*™e interpretation of a state constitutional A brief must contain some support for each 
***itton textually similar to a federal provi- contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 
APPENDIX "G 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92000214 
JAMES TURCSANSKI, 
Applicant, 
vs. * 
* 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on July 
20, 1992, at 3:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Robert 
Breeze, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Frank Nakamura, 
Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for medical expenses in connection with an 
alleged industrial accident of February 13, 1988. No temporary 
total disability or permanent partial impairment is claimed. 
Defendants deny liability on the grounds that medical causation is 
lacking, and further, that the statute of limitations bars this 
claim. 
Applicant made a preliminary Motion for Summary Judgment based 
on the opinion of Dr. Corey Anden. Dr. Anden later changed her 
opinion and the motion was withdrawn. Defendants made a Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. That motion 
was taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
JAMES TURCSANSKI 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant, James Turcsanski, was €»mployed by Salt Lake 
City Corporation's water department in 1988. On February 13, 1988, 
he and another employee, Jeff Jensen, were assigned to clean the 
ceiling of a pump house. 
The applicant was working on a ladder approximately 10 to 12 
feet off the floor, cleaning the ceiling overhead with a mop. 
Jensen was initially holding the ladder, but when Turcsanski began 
dripping on him, he moved. Shortly thereafter the ladder slipped 
and fell. Turcsanski fell straight down in a backwards position, 
and landed on his back with the ladder lying under him. He 
testified that the fall was somewhat like "riding the ladder" all 
the way down, with the ladder underneath him. He put his hands 
down to break his fall and injured his arm on a protruding valve. 
Photo exhibits A-3, A-4, and A-5 represent photographic attempts by 
Turcsanski to re-create the fall. 
After the fall, the applicant got off the ladder and felt pain 
in his right arm and leg. On cross-examination he specifically 
denied feeling any back pain. He went to the Emergency Room at 
Holy Cross Hospital. Their records indicate that he was treated 
for a contusion on his right forearm. (Ex. D-l, p. 6.) He 
returned to work and completed his shift. He has not missed any 
time from work due to this injury. 
During the next few years, Turcsanski was occasionally treated 
by his family physician, Dr. King Udall, for a variety of general 
medical problems. The records disclose a visit one month after the 
fall in 1988 for stomach problems (Ex. D-l, p. 14) . On June 20, 
1988, Turcsanski saw Dr. Udall complaining of pain in his back. 
Dr. Udall's notes state "Has pain in his back. No temperature. No 
back injury. Feels better today." He diagnosed prostatis and 
prescribed medication, (Ex. D-l, p. 15.) 
More than a year later, on November 20, 1989, Turcsanski saw 
Dr. Udall complaining of several things, including neck pain and 
depression. Dr. Udall characterized the depression as being "of 
greater concern" and prescribed Prozac. (Ex. D-l, p. 13.) He also 
ordered a cervical x-ray. The x-ray report indicates "marked 
degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc" between C5 and CS 
and between C6 and C7. (Ex. D-l, p. 34). 
On December 26, 1989, Dr. Udall saw him again and noted, "Mr. 
Turcsanski has had acute pain in the mid back, mainly on the left 
side. He has had this kind of problem in the past, usually with 
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acute infection. His neck is somewhat better." (Ex. D-l, p. 17.) 
Dr. Udall prescribed muscle relaxants. 
Other visits with Dr. Udall involved bronchitis, sinus 
conditions, cholesterol, and depression. At no time do the records 
indicate the applicant mentioning a 1988 fall or resultant back 
pain. 
On May 28, 1991, Dr. Udall saw him and noted, "Jim again has 
had severe low back pain. He is still concerned about sexual 
dysfunction.11 (Ex. D-l, p. 22.) Dr. Udall prescribed Anaprox 
again. The last notes from Dr. Udall are dated December 3, 1991 
and state, "no acute problems were noted." (Ex. D-l, p. 23). 
In December, 1991, the applicant consulted Dr. Corey Anden, a 
physiatrist. The circumstances of this medical treatment were in 
dispute. Turcsanski testified that he had begun to wonder if he 
had back problems as a result of his 1988 injury, and he called Dr. 
Jim Antinori, who had originally treated him at the Holy Cross 
Emergency Room. Dr. Antinori opined that a back problem could have 
resulted from the fall and referred him to Dr. Anden. (Ex. A-2.) 
The employer argues that Turcsanski began tying his back 
condition in to the 1988 injury because he had been denied 
insurance coverage for back treatment by his health carrier. 
Turcsanski admitted that he was unable to get his health insurance 
to cover his 1991 back problems because they were excluded under a 
pre-existing conditions clause. He then contacted Reta Halford, 
who handles workers' compensation claims for Salt Lake City, and 
inquired about receiving workers' compensation medical expense 
benefits for neck and back treatment. Halford denied the claim on 
the basis that no neck or back injuries had been reported in 
connection with the 1988 accident. (Ex. D-2.) 
Dr. Anden saw the applicant on December 9, 1991. Her records 
state that he reported developing neck pain and tenderness in about 
1990. She further noted that he had been evaluated by Dr. Udall 
and diagnosed with degenerative changes at that time. During her 
visit, she describes his symptoms as, "persistent left-sided low 
back pain," and adds, "He generally has increased low back pain 
every winter since 1989." (Ex. D-l, p. 46.) 
Dr. Anden recommended that the applicant have x-rays and 
possibly, a CT scan. She saw him in follow-up on December 23, 
1991, to evaluate the x-rays. Her report states, "post traumatic 
changes of the L5 vertebral body with disk space narrowing at L4-5 
most likely sustained in the industrial fall in 1988; possible left 
L3-4 radiculopathy secondary to disk herniation; left gluteus 
medius muscular strain." (Ex. D-l, p. 40.) She recommended a CT 
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scan but it was not performed due to the denial of coverage by the 
employer/carrier. 
On July 7, 1992, Dr. Anden issued a letter changing her 
previous opinion given in this case. That letter came about after 
Dr. Anden was given the emergency room medical records by Salt Lake 
City Corporation. She notes in that letter that her statement 
relating the lumbar injury to the 1988 fall should be corrected: 
"I feel that this was an incorrect statement on my part, in 
that, if a traumatic vertebral compression fracture had been 
sustained in that fall, he would have had complaints of back 
pain at the time, not over one year later. A more correct 
statement would have been that it is possible that the lumbar 
injury was sustained in the fall, although it could have been 
related to any prior or subsequent traumatic injury, as no 
other lumbar x-rays had been obtained to determine the age of 
the abnormality.11 
Dr. Anden concluded the letter with the statement: "In fact, 
it is unlikely that the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at L5 
was sustained in the fall." (Ex. D-l, p. 38.) 
Dr. Anden testified at the hearing and further explained her 
change of opinion. She stated that when she saw the emergency room 
medical records from the 1988 fall she learned that Turcsanski did 
not complain of back pain at the time of the fall. She testified 
that this absence of contemporaneous back pain was a critical 
factor in her change of opinion. She further testified that she 
would have expected Turcsanski's back to be "acutely painful" for 
4-6 weeks after the fall — if, in fact, a compression fracture had 
occurred. 
Dr. Roger Stuart performed a medical file review at the 
request of the defendants herein on July 9, 1992. His report 
concluded that the applicant's history and x-rays are, "very 
typical of the gradual and at times progressive nature of 
degenerative spinal changes related to age, genetic predisposition 
and activities. There is no documented cervical or lumbar pain at 
or near the time of his February 13, 1988 fall. Thus there is no 
evidence to support the assertion that the fall played a pivotal or 
major role in developing the diffuse degenerative changes present 
on Mr. Turcsanski's x-rays or in his current back pain problem." 
(Ex. D-l, p. 36.) 
JAMES TURCSANSKI 
ORDER 
PAGE FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant, James Turcsanski, did sustain a compensable 
industrial accident when he fell from a ladder on February 1, 1988. 
However, he has not proven any entitlement to further medical 
benefits as a result of that accident. No evidence of temporary 
total disability nor permanent partial disability is present in the 
record. 
First, the claim fails due to the application of the statute 
of limitations, U.C.A. 35-1-99. A claim for a back injury was not 
made by the applicant to his employer within a reasonable period 
after the date of the accident. The version of the statute in 
effect at the time of his February 13, 1988, fall read: "If no 
notice of accident and injury is given to the employer within one 
year from the date of the accident, the right to compensation shall, 
be wholly barred.11 Although notice of the fall and an arm injury 
was clearly given to the employer, notice of a back injury was not 
given until December, 1991 — nearly four years later. This 
failure to notify the employer of an injury seriously prejudiced 
their ability to evaluate and treat that injury. 
Applicant argues that the language of the pre-1988 statute, 
which provides for tolling of the statute of limitations until the 
insurance company (employer) gives a written notice of denial, 
should apply to preserve his claim. While it is true that the 
insurance company did not give Turcsanski a written denial of 
liability, it was because they had no way of knowing he would re-
appear four years later with a new claim for a back injury. The 
employer had paid for the emergency room visit promptly and no 
follow-up care or missed work had resulted in three years. They 
had no reason to send a denial of further liability because no 
further liability was being claimed, and therefore, any application 
of that portion of the statute to these facts would be strained. 
Beyond the statute of limitations questions, Turcsanski has 
failed to sustain his burden of proving medical causation in 
relation to the treatment of his back. The Administrative Law 
Judge finds that medical causation is lacking due to 1) the absence 
of back pain at the time of his 1988 fall, 2) the absence of missed 
work at the time of the fall or thereafter, 3) the multi-year long 
delay in applicant's attribution of the back pain to the fall, 4) 
applicant's inconsistent reports of back pain to health care 
providers while readily seeking treatment for other conditions, 5) 
the inability of his physicians to state a causal relationship 
between the 1988 fall and the back pain, 6) the documented presence 
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of degenerative disc disease as an alternative cause of his pain, 
and 7) the suggestion that one of applicant's motives in making 
this claim was to obtain coverage through workers' compensation 
insurance several years later because it was being denied him 
through his private health insurance. In short, there is simply no 
credible medical or factual evidence that the back pain is related 
to the 1988 fall. 
The applicant urged the Commission to send this matter to a 
medical panel for yet another evaluation, based on the argument 
that Drs. Anden, Antinori and Udall thought that medical causation 
was "possibly" present. Such equivocations are not sufficient to 
put the medical issue in dispute. It is not clear what information 
Dr. Udall has concerning the 1988 fall, and Dr. Anden states it is 
actually unlikely that there is a relationship/ 
Rather than rely on these doctors' recent speculative opinions 
as to what might be "possible," the Administrative Law Judge has 
examined the contemporaneous medical records from the 1988 fall and 
subsequent visits. Because those records do not identify any 
medical or factual link between the fall and back pain, and because 
none of the doctors will go beyond the realm of "possibility," she 
finds no significant medical issue to justify use of a medical 
panel as required by Commission Rule. This decision is consistent 
with the language of the statute, U.C.A. 35-L-77, which clearly 
places referral to a Medical Panel within the discretion of the 
Commission. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of James Turcsanski for 
further medical benefits in connection with his February 13, 1988 
industrial accident is denied, and the same is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Q of August, 1992, the 
attached FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER in the case 
of James Turcsanski was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following 
persons at the following addresses: 
James Turcsanski 
4008 Stillwater Way 
WVC UT 84120 
Robert Breeze, Atty 
221 E Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Frank Nakamura, Atty 
451 S State Street #505 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
V 
June S. Harrison, Paralegal 
Adjudication Division 
/jsh 
APPENDIX "H" 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
JAMES TURCSANSKI, * 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF MOTION 
vs. * FOR REVIEW 
k 
it 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, * 
* Case No. 92000214 
* 
Respondent. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * # * * * * * * * * * • * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to ut ih 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12 
The applicant asks us to review the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order of the administrative law judge (ALJ1 
dated August 27, 1992. 
The applicant alleges 1 he tallowing factual errors: 
1 The applicant requested permanent total disability 
benefits once his condition had stabilized suf-
ficiently, and the ALJ incorrectly said that the an 
plicant did not claim these benefits. 
2. The ALJ failed to reflect the testimony of Jeff Jan-
sen to the effect that the fall was of such a sever-
ity that he thought Mr. Turcsanski was dead. 
), The ALJ said that the applicant went to see Dr. Udall 
on June 20, 1988 complaining of back pain when the 
applicant actually had gone to see Dr. Barlow. 
4 The ALJ incorrectly stated that there was evidence to 
the effect that the applicant could not get his group 
health insurer to cover the back problem. 
5. The ALJ made no reference to the city attorney going 
ex parte to visit Dr. Anden's office to discuss the 
applicant's case on July 7, 199 2 without the 
applicant's or his counsel's consent. 
The applicant further alleges the following legal objections: 
1. There is no requirement in the pre July 1, 1988 
version of the workers' compensation statute of 
limitations that all physical maladies resulting from 
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the accident be reported within one year. 
2. The ALJ erred when she determined that the applicant 
did not meet his burden of proof with respect to the 
issue of medical causation. 
The applicant requests that we reverse the decision of the 
ALJ, or in the alternative, requests that we order the matter 
referred to a medical panel. 
A brief review of the facts will be set forth. On February 
13, 1988, the applicant and another employee were employed by the 
Salt Lake City Corporation, and were cleaning the ceiling of a pump 
house. The applicant was on a ladder 10 to 12 feet from the floor. 
The ladder slipped, and the applicant fell straight down, but 
backwards. He landed on his back with the ladder beneath him. He 
put his hands down to break his fall, and he injured his arm on a 
protrusion. 
After the fall, the applicant felt pain in his right leg and 
arm. He went to the emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital where he 
was treated for a contusion to his right forearm. He returned to 
work to complete his shift, and did not miss any work time due to 
injury. 
During the next several years, the applicant was treated for 
a variety of general medical conditions. With regard to the 
problems for which he claims workers7 compensation, he was treated 
on June 20, 1988 by Dr. Barlow for pain his back. The doctor 
determined that there was no back injury, and diagnosed prostatis. 
On November 20, 1989, the applicant saw Dr. Udall for neck 
pain and depression. An x-ray was taken which indicated "marked 
degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc" between C5 and C6 
and between C6 and C7. 
On December 26, 1989, the applicant was treated by Dr. Udall 
for acute pain on the left side in the mid back. The doctor 
prescribed muscle relaxants. 
On May 28, 1991, among other problems, Dr. Udall treated the 
applicant for low back pain. On December 3, 1991, Dr. Udall stated 
that there were "no acute problems ... noted.* 
With regard to the next treatment on December 9, 1991, there 
was a dispute between the parties as to the circumstances of 
treatment. Dr. Anden saw the applicant on this date, and related 
that the applicant began developing neck tenderness and pain around 
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1990. Her records note that the applicant had been evaluated by 
Dr. Udall who noted degenerative changes. Dr. Anden stated the 
applicant's symptoms to be "persistent left-sided low back pain , , , 
[which] has increased ... every winter since 1989." She prescribed 
x-rays and, possibly, a CT scan. She reviewed the x-rays on 
December 23, 199 2, and stated that there were "post traumatic 
changes of the L5 vertebral body with disk space narrowing at L4-5 
most likely sustained in the industrial fall in 1988[;] ... 
possible left L3-4 radiculopathy secondary to disk herniation[;] 
... [and] left gluteus medius muscular strain," 
The applicant testified that he went to see Dr. Anden based on 
a recommendation from the physician who originally treated the 
applicant at the emergency room. Based on the applicant's 
suspician that his current back problems were related to the 1988 
fall, he had called the emergency room physician who felt that a 
back problem could have resulted from the fall. 
The employer, however, alleged that the applicant could not 
jet coverage for back treatment by his health insurance carrier due 
t o a pre-existing condition exclusion, and consequently attempted 
to obtain coverage under workers' compensation. The applicant 
claims that he did not bother to file with his health insurance 
provider because of the exclusion. In any event, the employer 
denied the applicant's claim based on the applicant's failure to 
report any neck or back injuries in connection with the 1988 
accident. 
til', Anden changed her previous opinion as to the likely cause 
oi the injury on July 7, 1992. Apparently, she was given the 
emergency room medical records, and after review, she issued a 
letter in essence retracting her previous opinion, concluding that 
it was unlikely that the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at 
L5 was sustained in the fall. Further, she testified at the 
hearing to explain her change of opinion. She testified that the 
absence of contemporaneous back pain at the time of the fall was a 
critical factor in changing her view, and that she would have 
expected the applicant's back to be acutely painful for 4-6 weeks 
subsequent to the fall if a compression fracture had occurred. 
Finally, a medical file review by Dr. Stuart on behalf of the 
defendants on July 9, 1992 yielded a report showing that the 
changes to the applicant's spine were degenerative changes related 
to age, genetic predisposition, and activites. The doctor 
concluded that there was no evidence to suppoort the assertion that 
the fall played a major role in developing the degenerative changes 
present in the x-rays or In the applicant's current back problems. 
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The ALJ determined that the applicant did sustain a 
compensable industrial accident on February 1, 1988, but that he 
did not prove any entitlement to further medical benefits as a 
result of that accident. Further, she concluded that the applicant 
had not proved medical causation of his back problems due to: 
1. the absence of back pain at the time of his 1988 
fall; 
2. the absence of missed work at the time of the fall 
or thereafter; 
3. the multi-year long delay in applicant's attribution 
of the back pain to the fall; 
4. the applicant's inconsistent reports of back pain to 
health care providers while readily seeking treatment 
for other conditions; 
5. the inability of his physicians to state a causal re-
lationship between the 1988 fall and the back pain; 
6. the documented presence of degenerative disc disease 
as an alternative cause of his pain, and, 
7. the suggestion that one of the applicant's motives 
in making this claim was to obtain coverage through 
workers' compensation insurance several years later 
because it was being denied him through his private 
health insurance. 
Order, ALJ dated August 27, 1992 at 5-6. 
The ALJ also decided that the failure of the employee to 
provide notice to the employer of accident and injury within one 
year from the date of the accident barred the applicant from any 
compensation. The applicant did not give notice of the alleged 
back injury until December 1991, four years after the accident. 
This reliance on the statute of limitations to bar the applicant 
from recovery was an additional reason to the lack of medical 
causation. 
We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the file to 
support the ALJ's decision when the entire record is considered. 
There aure some minor errors which are harmless, and do not affect 
the outcome of this case. These errors do not affect the impact of 
the statute of limitations, or the applicant's failure to show 
medical causation. We will correct these errors since the 
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respondent concurs. 
The doctor who treated the applicant on June 20, 1988 was Dr , 
Barlow rather than Dr. Udall. The error in naming the physician 
was harmless. We will also determine that the applicant asked for 
permanent partial impairment, but this determination does not 
affect the outcome based on the failure of the applicant to adhere 
to the statute of limitations or to show medical causation. We do 
not view the alleged failure of the ALJ to include in her opinion 
that Jeff Jensen thought the applicant to be dead after the 
applicant fell to be significant especially since the applicant 
returned to work, and missed no work as a result of the accident. 
The alleged error relating to the "strong arm tactics11 in 
interviewing the respondents witness is not supported by the 
evidence, and we deem it to be without merit, Another fact which 
the applicant felt that the ALJ should reflect in her opinion was 
that Dr. Anden was affiliated with a clinic which is a contract 
provider for the city. Even if the ALT had not considered this 
fact, the evidence is overwhelming that the applicant did not meet 
his burden of showing medical causation. Even if such was error, 
it was harmless under the circumstances. 
With regard to the alleged error as to whether the applicant 
had been denied health insurance coverage or had merely believed 
that his policy of coverage would deny him health insurance 
coverage, we find that the net effect of either is the same, acting 
as if he had no health insurance for this problem. However, this 
belief of the applicant was only one small factor in the overall 
equation of this case, and standing alone is not determinative of 
the outcome. There was enough evidence to support the findings of 
the ALJ in this determination. 
We also determine that the ALJ was correct in her refusal to 
send this case to a medical panel, Referral to a medical panel is 
within the discretion of the ALJ in this case. U.C.A. Section 35-
1-77. There was no significant medical issue for the medical panel 
to determine. The strongest term used by the doctors which could 
support a medical panel was a "possible" medical causation* The 
records do not identify any medical or factual link between the 
fall and the back pain. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated August 27, is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
